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What do child psychotherapists know? 
 
Michael Rustin 
 
In the decades after the death of Freud in 1939, the psychoanalytic tradition in 
Britain was substantially shaped by  child analysis. Melanie Klein’s 
discoveries   emerged from psychoanalytic practice with children, which was 
based on  ‘play technique’. Some of  Donald Winnicott’s most important ideas 
were  developed through  work with children, and through study of the 
relationships between mothers and babies.  Although the main clinical context 
for Bion’s discoveries was the analysis of  adult psychotic patients,  among his 
resources in undertaking these investigations were the theories of paranoid-
schizoid and depressive mental functioning and projective identification, from 
which his  account of the origins of the mental apparatus and of the container-
contained relation  emerged.   There are notable parallels between Esther 
Bick’s understanding of the acute anxieties of infancy (the fear of ‘falling to 
pieces’)  and Bion’s understanding of the fragmented states of mind occurring 
in psychotic patients.  Anna Freud was as dedicated as Melanie Klein to the 
analysis of children, and many of her principal contributions to psychoanalysis  
were based on this.   Thus the theoretical advances  of the 1940s and 1950s 
in the British psychoanalytic tradition could not have occurred without the  
priority given to the psychoanalysis of children, and the corpus of ideas and 
techniques with which British analysts now work can scarcely be imagined 
without that contribution. 
 
This should hardly be a  surprise. Psychoanalysis is a theory of  development, 
explaining the psychic pain and malfunctions which are its clinical object 
through understandings of what happens, internally and externally, in the 
early life of children.  Most  psychoanalysts believe that they have access,  
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through the psychoanalysis of adults to the ‘child in the adult’ – that is to the 
unconscious beliefs and habits of mind formed in response to early 
experiences.  It is held that these early dispositions of mind, and sometimes  
memories,  are re-lived within the transference setting, and are understood 
through the counter-transferences of analysts.  Freud thought of 
psychoanalysis in part by analogy with archaeology, as  the excavation of 
buried layers of consciousness.  But whatever the possibilities of gaining 
access to unconscious states of mind through analysis in adulthood,  the 
psychoanalysis of children gave new and direct access to these early 
formations of mind.   
 
In the past few decades, the analysis of children by psychoanalysts has, 
rather  sadly, declined.  In its place, the new profession of psychoanalytic 
child psychotherapists has grown up, to a size   comparable with that of  the 
British Psychoanalytical Society. There has been a great deal of co-operation 
between the psychoanalysts  and the child psychotherapists,  and child 
psychotherapy remains closely linked to the mainstream  psychoanalytic 
tradition in Britain .  But the migration of  child analysis to child psychotherapy  
largely being undertaken within  public mental health services for  children 
and families,1  means that if we want to understand the generation of  new 
knowledge in child analysis in Britain today, it  is to child psychotherapy we 
must look. 
 
The Generation of Knowledge in Psychoanalysis  
 
In this chapter I am going to review some major achievements of the clinical 
research programme of child psychotherapy, before considering  the 
encounter between psychoanalysis and ‘mainstream’  social scientific 
research methods which is a major  topic of this book.    But before doing this, 
it is necessary to say something about  scientific methods more broadly.    
 
                                            
1
 In the NHS child psychotherapists mostly see patients on a once-weekly basis, though 
intensive cases provide a major element of their training. It does  often prove possible to do 
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Since its invention  as a new paradigm  by Sigmund Freud, psychoanalysis 
has evolved  as a  highly productive research programme.  Its primary  
research method has been clinical, its main laboratory has been the 
consulting room.  Its theories and classifications (of developmental patterns, 
psychic structures, psychopathologies) have continued to develop, as 
psychoanalysts  have revised and extended their theories to take account of 
new clinical evidence.   The main purpose of this gathering of knowledge has 
been to inform clinicians in their practice.  
 
It is  normal in the history of the sciences for  techniques of investigation to 
evolve in response to the nature of particular  objects of research.  Consider, 
for example, the differences between  
 
• the mathematical sciences, which study ‘virtual objects’.  
• physics, whose commitment is to discovering uniform and universal 
laws about the elementary properties of nature.  
• the biological sciences, much of whose agenda has until recent years 
been the description and classification of the diversity of species, 
unified  by  the theory of natural selection which is most informative  in 
its application to particular species and eco-systems. 
• the human sciences, which have to take account not only of the 
diversity of human kind, but also of the  self-understanding and  self-
transformative properties of human  subjects. The human sciences for 
these latter  reasons have had to acknowledge   limitations to the 
empirical scope of the theories they devise – they continually trace a 
moving target.  A further complication of the human sciences,  , is that 
their perspectives have  usually been shaped  by commitments of 
value, which sustain different research agendas, as human scientists 
seek to  understand the conditions of possibility of this or that 
imaginable world.  It is not only the 'immaturity' of the human sciences 
(including psychoanalysis) which have led to their disunity, but the 
                                                                                                                             
transference-based psychoanalytic work within what some might see as unpromising 
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differences of moral viewpoint which continue to inform and divide 
them. 
 
There is thus not one science, but many  (Galison and Stump 1996). 
Psychoanalysis has too often been negatively judged by criteria deriving from 
a philosophy of science whose ideal typical model was the physical science of 
the early 20th century 2 , and from a positivist psychological tradition which 
reduced the complexity of its human subjects in order to follow its preferred 
methods of experiment and measurement. I have argued elsewhere  that the 
specificity of method of psychoanalysis is appropriate to its object of study.   
 
 
In the history of psychoanalysis, and more recently in child psychotherapy,  
knowledge has been advanced  through the juxtaposition of new clinical 
findings, with established  classifications,  and theories.  Newly  recognised 
phenomena have been designated by  new concepts. (Rustin 2002a, 2007, 
Hughes 2004). Taxonomies  (for example of psychopathologies) have  
evolved to become more differentiated and fine-grained  in response to 
clinical experience. T.S. Kuhn (2000) in The Road since Structure (chapter 4)  
described the proliferation of ideas within a paradigm which accompanied the 
'puzzle-solving' of normal science as a kind of 'speciation', comparing this with 
the evolution of living species. This is a useful metaphor for understanding the 
proliferation of concepts and theories in psychoanalysis. 
 
There is a tension in psychoanalysis between the wish to  understand 
particular experiences and persons, and the goal of discovering uniformities 
and laws governing  all psychic phenomena.  If one is too  taken up with 
individuals, there will be no concepts or theories to  confer  meaning. But  if 
                                                                                                                             
circumstances.   
2
 David Stove (1982) suggested that Popper's model of 'falsifiability' , which rejects the 
inductive principle that positive empirical evidence provides good reasons for belief in a 
theory, and thus proposes a rigorous scepticism, was a response to the upheaval to 
Newtonian science brought about by Einstein. Popper wished to ensure that no-one would 
ever again be deceived by certainty. Permanent scientific revolution would henceforth rule. 
One can see how  Kuhn's  theory of scientific revolutions gave this programme a historical 
perspective.  
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one is too committed to abstractions, one loses sight of individual persons, 
making descriptions lifeless and without sense  to patients themselves.   
When Bion urged that analysts 'eschew memory and desire', and be open  to 
an  experience of 'unknowing', he was emphasising the dangers that the dead 
hand of theory and preconception could bring to the analytic encounter. But 
he remained deeply committed to  theoretical notations, and attempted  their 
systematic classification in the formulation of his ‘grid’.  Like  complexity 
theorists  who have defined  'the edge of chaos' as the primary location of 
creativity and innovation,  Bion insisted that psychoanalysts need to expose 
themselves  to the disorientation which inevitably follows experiences of the 
particular,  but also remain attentive to the explanatory power that 
psychoanalytic thinking embodies.  
 
Psychoanalysis and child psychotherapy are shaped as vocations by their  
encounter with  the individuality   of their patients understood  as whole 
persons.  In psychoanalytic work, diagnostic labels for patients, although to a 
degree necessary,  are secondary  to understandings which respect individual 
selfhood  and subject's desire for self-understanding.     One can think of 
psychoanalytic concepts as constituting  a 'virtual library' of resources for 
naming and explaining clinical phenomena.  The  task for therapist and 
supervisor is to decide  on the most useful correspondences between new 
clinical phenomena,  and the pre-existing ideas  which can  give them 
meaning, either by 'vertical' deduction from more abstract principles (e.g. the 
Oedipus Complex) or by 'horizontal'  analogy with other known  cases.  
Sometimes clinicians come to recognise that  new  juxtapositions and 
combinations of ideas are called for by the need to give a  difficult clinical 
experience a shape and a name.  
  
 
Most of the time, most psychoanalysts and child psychotherapists work to 
bring together experience and the lexicons of understanding already 
established.  For  clinical purposes, to understand the patient and the ongoing 
process of her psychotherapy, with some coherent reference to the 
formulations of the literature, is  difficult  in itself. The practice of 'normal 
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science' or 'puzzle solving' in psychoanalysis  involves at a  basic  level  
understanding individual patients. It is because of  this commitment of 
psychoanalysis to the complexity of its individual subjects that its findings 
have been best represented in represented in case-studies, and in 
monographs on different sub-species of pathology or  development, rather 
than in the codified style of a textbook.  
 
 
But sometimes,  psychoanalysts have not been content with trying to make 
sense of individual patients within the terms of already-established ideas.  
Under pressure of difficulties in understanding recalcitrant clinical 
phenomena,  analysts have reflected  on the adequacy of the concepts  
available to them, and have proposed new conceptions.  The development of 
theories, taxonomies and techniques in psychoanalysis takes place in 
response to encounters with recalcitrant 'facts; emergent theories then being 
subjected to later clinical test and trial.  The  development of psychoanalytic 
theory can thus be  understand  as the record of  a continuing clinical 
research programme.  Imaginative conjecture and deductive brilliance   have 
had a major place - no one can doubt the theoretical  capacities  which  Klein, 
Bion, Winnicott or  Meltzer   brought to exploring the potentialities of ideas.   
But  theories have usually been barren in this field unless they have  rapidly 
found a clinical referent, or some other application to experience.  
 
During most of the history of psychoanalysis, this development has proceeded 
according to criteria which have been given little explicit specification.   
Psychoanalysis has  been a field of 'tacit knowledge', in Michael Polanyi's  
(1958)  terms, of 'craft practices'  and intellectual sensibilities, fine-honed and 
shared within the knowledge-community of the profession, but subject to little 
formal clarification at  'meta-levels' of justification.  The length and intensity of 
training of psychoanalysts, and the meticulous routines (observation, 
supervision, personal analysis)  of which its learning processes are made up, 
are designed to achieve a consistent quality of practice, internalised as  
professional 'second nature'. (Rustin 2003) 
 
 7
In recent years, this   situation has begun to change, under two opposite 
pressures. On the one hand implicit claims to professional competence do not 
fare well in the culture of 'evidence-based medicine’  and  psychotherapists  
have been placed under  pressure to provide empirical justification of their 
knowledge and practice. On the other hand, former orthodoxies in the 
philosophy of science have been challenged by developments in the history 
and sociology of science, and there has been greater understanding of the  
diversity of actual methods.  Psychoanalysts have come to see that their own 
procedures can be made  more accountable  without compromising the 
essence of psychoanalytic practice.  Academic accreditation of psychoanalytic 
trainings has also  made a difference,  since it has demanded explicit 
justification of methodologies.  A vigorous debate about the role of research in 
psychoanalysis has thus begun, to which of course this book is a contribution. 
 
One  lesson which can be learned from the recent history and sociology of 
science,  for example in the work of Kuhn (1962, 2000) and Latour (1983, 
1987, 1988)  is that descriptive questions  concerning  what scientists  do, and 
how they do it, are more illuminating than  prescriptive judgements  which 
seek to demarcate 'good' from 'bad' scientific practice.   Thus the best starting 
point for considering the role of research  in child psychotherapy is  to review 
the  contributions to knowledge which have been achieved by this discipline 
since its inception in 1948,  and to explore how these have come about.   
Some  fields of discovery stand out as outstanding examples in a wide field..  
 
Clinical Research in Child Psychotherapy 
  
Consider first, what has been learned over the past thirty years about 
psychoanalytic work with severely deprived children. since the publication of 
Gianna Williams’  seminal 1974 paper, Doubly Deprived,  Here was a  
population of children (and their families) which was earlier thought 
untreatable by psychoanalytic methods.  At an earlier stage of child analysis, 
as Margaret Rustin has recently pointed out, most  patients were recruited 
from the middle-class professional culture of psychoanalysis itself, and were 
given analytic treatment in response to difficulties far less severe than those 
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which are encountered routinely by contemporary CAMHS services.   But  the 
embryo profession of child psychotherapy, embedded as it was in family 
mental health services, began to respond to the needs of  patients drawn from 
families in the care of  social services, who had experienced often 
catastrophic breakdowns. These children might, by the time of referral, be in 
children's homes or later in foster-  or adoptive-placements which were 
proving extremely difficult for all concerned. 
 
Gianna Williams defined the relevance of a psychoanalytic understanding to 
this situation, in her recognition that ‘deprivation’ in the lives of such children 
was not merely ‘external’, in a child’s loss of real parents, but also had 
another dimension, in the damage to a child's 'internal parents'   effected by 
traumatic experiences or abandonment.   Unless this internal damage  was 
addressed it was likely that attempts to achieve external reparation through 
providing a new family for a child would encounter extreme difficulties.  
Children in such placements were often found to test their new foster-carers  
to the point of despair, as they lived out the damaged object-relationships of 
their internal worlds, in the vulnerable settings of their new homes.    
 
 
The child psychotherapists’  method of investigating this situation was largely 
clinical.  Psychotherapists tried to work therapeutically with such patients, 
adapting their technique accordingly.  They developed  ideas  which enabled 
them to understand their clinical experience.  They practised  a co-operative 
method of work, ‘the practitioners' workshop' (Rustin 1991) as a way  of 
thinking together,  and supporting each other and their trainees in coping with 
the extreme stress of this work.   Mary Boston and Rolene Szur’s edited 
collection, Psychotherapy with Severely Deprived Children (1983) was the 
outcome of  such a workshop.  Informally, clinical workshops like this enable 
practitioners to  explore and test out ideas with many similar cases, 
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overcoming some of the difficulty of clinicians’ work with single cases, and 
making possible a measure of generalisation. 3 
 
The most  significant clinical evidence arose from the severity of the impact of  
these patients on their therapists.  The patients’ hostility, desperation, and 
rejection was often overwhelming, and difficult to manage both personally and 
therapeutically.  Theoretically essential was attention to the counter-
transference, and to what Betty Joseph has  described as the ‘total 
transference situation’. (Joseph 1989, 1994).  Only if what was being 
experienced by the therapist was understood at least in part as a projection by 
the child patient of his own unbearable states of mind, and as 
communications to the therapist of what it felt like to be such a child, did the 
situation become comprehensible, and one with which analytic  work became 
possible.     
 
Bion’s concept of the container-contained relation was also central to this 
exploration.  Therapists found that their own capacity, and that of the 
therapeutic setting, to contain the violence and anxiety of their patients was 
stretched to the limit, but they also learned  that  such containment was the 
precondition of  any analytic  work.   They came to understand that the origin 
of the patients’ difficulty often lay  in extreme failures of containment during 
their earlier history.  Gianna Williams (1997) elaborated her understanding of 
the container-contained relation, to take account of its different possible 
modalities.  In contrast to the form of facilitating containment dominated by the 
role of Bion’s ‘alpha function’ (the ‘metabolisation’ of psychic experience, in 
particular  unconscious anxiety, through ‘reverie’) she evolved the concept of 
‘omega function’ to characterise its opposite, namely the intrusive or toxic 
projection into others (especially  infants) of states of anxiety found 
unbearable by parental figures.  (See also Selma Fraiburg 1975 on intrusive 
kinds of projection into infants.)  
 
                                            
3
 The Anna Freud Centre also established clinical workshops at an early stage, which gave 
rise to some important  papers, for example Rosenfeld and Sprince (1963).   
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 Williams extended the relevance of this reversal of containment to the field of 
eating disorders in children and adolescents.(Williams 1997a, 1997b).  She 
and her colleagues in another clinical workshop setting have been able to 
develop  understanding  of the rejection of food, and of other life-giving 
intakes, as unconscious responses to early  experiences in which infants 
experienced their mothers as intrusive rather than containing,  and where  
feeding  was felt to be emotionally  toxic.  The clinical evidence for this 
hypothesis also came from the dynamics of the transference and the 
countertransference. Patients were found to attack  the meaning and care 
offered within the psychotherapy setting, and this was understood as  a 
representation of the  patients' broader  refusal of nurturing and feeding 
relationships.   
 
The psychoanalytic understanding of severely deprived children has been 
considerably developed since the publication of Williams’ original paper  and 
Boston’s and Szur’s book.    Some writers (Kenrick 2005, Rustin 2001)  have 
explored issues of  technique, describing the  violent attacks on therapist and 
setting made by patients, and  techniques which they have adopted to cope 
with these. This writing has enabled  clinicians to see parallels with their   own 
experience, and  feel less  overburdened by a  sense of failure. It has enabled  
helped  therapists and their supervisors to  anticipate  difficult situations.  
Different aspects of the states of mind of such patients have been elaborated. 
Hamish Canham (1999)  described the characteristic timelessness of the 
world of such patients,  and the significance of establishing a  sense of time. 
In another paper  Canham (2004) described the extreme physicality of such a 
patient, and Juliet Hopkins (2000)  described difficulties in the management of 
sessions, and  established important equivalences between the 
understandings of these phenomena within psychoanalysis and attachment 
theory. In the related field of adoption, Margaret Rustin (1999) drew attention 
to the ‘multiple families  in mind’  of adopted children (their biological parents, 
adoptive parents, and parents-in-phantasy), and the reciprocal issue  for 
adoptive parents of the biological children they do not have, but who may 
nevertheless be present  in their minds.  This literature is  psychoanalytic in its 
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exploration of the  dimension of the problem of these children which is located 
in their inner world.    
 
A  field of ‘clinical research’ of this kind evolves  as a ‘branching tree’ of   
classifications. Here  we can add the particularity of sexual abuse and sexual 
enactment as an aspect of deprivation, and its possible impact in the clinical 
situation (Lanyado 1991, Ironside 1995) and the  significance of the 
experience of the oedipus complex, as another developmental  moment, and 
link with classical psychoanalytic theory. (Anderson  2003,  Bartram 2003,  
Canham 2003)  It has more recently become recognised that the 
management or mis-management of children with difficulties within the care 
system is the source of  additional problems of its own – a kind of iatrogenic 
mental illness  - and child psychotherapists have investigated the experiences 
of transition, in which a care-system seems to lose capacity to hold the 
children in mind. (Hindle  2000, Hunter 2001  Philps 2003).   Margaret Rustin 
explored this situation in a different way in her commentary on the difficulties 
of the care-system in responding to the situation of Victoria   Climbié, 
difficulties which led  to her death (Rustin 2005).  
 
A  second leading example  of clinical research in child psychotherapy has 
been in the field of  autism and its associated disorders.  We can see here a 
succession of clinical and theoretical studies undertaken by child 
psychotherapists, (Alvarez 1992, Alvarez and Reid 1999,  Haag 2000,  Houzel 
2004, Rhode 1994, Tustin 1992)  though in  cooperation with psychoanalysts 
such as Donald Meltzer (Meltzer et al. 1975) , and in dialogue with 
experimental  psychologists working in child study laboratories, who  have  
mapped out aspects of behaviour  previously inaccessible to study .  Since 
almost by definition, children suffering from autism are unavailable  to a major 
degree to psychoanalytic interventions based on language and interpretation, 
clinical investigators of autistic phenomena have made extensive use of the  
methods of psychoanalytic infant observation which were developed initially 
by Esther Bick (Briggs 2003)  but then became  the pre-clinical foundation of 
child psychotherapy training.  The close observation of the ‘state of being’ of 
autistic patients, in their relation to their own bodies, to physical objects and 
 12 
sensations, and to the body and person of their therapists, has been one way 
in which  child psychotherapists have sought to understand the origin and 
meaning of autistic disorders.   
 
It is often the case that psychoanalytic understanding  has been advanced not 
by the investigation of normal or average patterns of development, but by the 
need  to understand those patterns which lie at the furthest extremes of 
abnormality  - autistic or psychotic states, for example.  Autism is a topic of 
broad significance for psychoanalysis because it reflects a disturbance of 
development which seems to have its onset in very early bodily and mental 
experience.  
 
Links  between the understanding of autism, and the psychoanalytic theory of 
early development, were very clearly set out in  what Frances Tustin said 
would be her  last published article (1994) in which she described the view of 
the origin of  narcissism she had reached as a consequence of her studies of 
autism, in contrast to her earlier view.  In this paper, she rejected the idea that 
narcissism was, as Freud had written, an  original condition from which 
individuals later emerged.  She wrote that narcissism  - the delusion of a self-
sufficient self, the denial of relationship with an object-  is  a defence against a 
separation from mother which is experienced as traumatic and terrifying.  In 
normal development, the baby is from the beginning in a reciprocal 
relationship with the breast, and mother, though this relationship   becomes 
more complex and differentiated as the baby develops.  It is this sense of 
relatedness and safe dependence  - containment has become a usual term 
for it – which sustains the baby’s sense of himself or herself, as capable of 
surviving even when not  in close contact with its mother.   
 
Psychoanalytic investigators of autism have clarified that the developmental 
tasks which babies have to cope with in their first weeks of life have from the 
start a mental as well as a physical aspect.  It was difficult to give a credible 
account of this view when psychoanalysts had seemed to be ascribing to tiny 
infants more complex ‘inner worlds’  than it seemed conceivable that they 
could have.   Some of the argument between sensitive observers of infant 
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development such as Daniel Stern or Colwyn Trevarthen, and child 
psychotherapists  focused on the implausibility, according to the former, of 
assigning states of phantasy to infants at a stage when they seemed not to 
have the mental resources which made phantasy possible. 
 
But the  focus within the psychoanalytic study of autism on those very early 
states of mind which are concerned with basic bodily and psychic integration 
have brought some progress in understanding early development from a 
psychoanalytic perspective.  The fear of  ‘falling to pieces‘ or liquifying, 
described by Esther Bick (1968)  and  Sydney Klein (1980)  is more primitive 
than the anxieties about ‘objects’ posited by  the theory of the paranoid-
schizoid position.  Until some sense of coherence and unity of the self is 
achieved, there is no possibility of distinguishing self from other, the loved  
from the  hated object.  Autism is a defence against  the anxiety of 
disintegration and fragmentation which follows upon the failure of the primary 
object to support the self in its earliest experiences of separation. Of course 
this may be the outcome not of  actual deficit in the capacity of the primary 
object, but may rather be the consequence of the initial fragility and 
vulnerability of the infant, perhaps of  genetic  origin, or as a consequence of 
prematurity or illness in mother or infant.  But subjectively, this fragile  infant’s 
experience is that any separation, and thus exploration of the qualities of its 
object, is unbearable, and is experienced as catastrophic.  
 
The  observational and clinical research programme of investigators of autism 
has been exploring many of the different sensory  modalities of the infant’s 
earliest experiences, to see the particular part each of these has in the 
development of autistic defences.  Significantly,  much of this work has been 
undertaken with the support of clinical workshops.  In Europe, Susanne 
Maiello (1995) has studied the primary experience of ‘the sound object’, 
tracing this back to pre-natal experience, and examining its role as an element 
in the relationship of infant and mother.  Genevieve Haag (2000) has 
developed an understanding of the normal experience of the body as 
possessing a backbone,  and a symmetrical organisation of  left and right 
sides, observing the  disturbance of this symmetrical unity in autistic 
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development.  These observers of autistic children have noted their extreme 
preoccupation with bodily surfaces and orifices, preoccupation with surfaces 
providing a kind of contact with or relation to the world in the absence of a 
sense of that world as  three-dimensional, and that persons and things have 
interiors and exteriors.  Maria Rhode  (2004) has explored the infant's 
experience of the mouth in a situation where there is no tolerance of 
separation from mother.  
 
These ideas  have had consequences for clinical technique. Since autistic 
children’s primary form of contact with the world, and with others, may be 
through adhesion to or exploration of such physical surfaces, it has been 
found necessary to attend closely to  children’s physical engagement with the 
therapist and the  setting, seeking out kinds of responsiveness to them which 
enhances their sense of trust and agency, as the precondition for more 
complex communications.   Anne Alvarez (1992)  has described her active 
technique of ‘reclamation', with its aim of enhancing her patient’s expressive 
and communicative repertoire in order to get a live relationship started.  
 
The  conjecture underlying this work is that  the emergence of a capacity for 
experience of the self as separate from its object, and of the body and mind 
held together with joined-up-ness and intentionality, is a primary 
developmental task, which depends for its fulfilment on the interaction 
between a receptive and responsive mother (or equivalent) and an object-
seeking baby.   If the containing relationship is absent, the infant may turn 
away from the object, and seek to sustain itself from its own resources. If the  
infant lacks the innate capacities for object-seeking, there may be  similarly 
devastating consequences.  Deprived of containment, or thrown on to its own 
self-sustaining resources, infants will be unable to sustain the task of creating 
a coherent body and mind, and will evolve instead substitute modes of bodily 
survival and continuity,  which  become barriers  to normal development and 
relationship. 4 
                                            
4
 I have been put in mind of these developmental issues by informal observations of my baby 
granddaughter, aged 11 months at the time of writing. What struck me, during her first few 
months, was the extent to which she seemed preoccupied with getting to know and 
 15 
 
The  substantial programme of clinical and observational study of children 
with these difficulties has given rise to  theoretical formulations, setting out the 
implications of these findings for the understanding of psychic development.  
One  useful theorisation of this kind has been set out by  Thomas Ogden 
(1989), in his concept  of the ‘contiguous-autistic position’ which he holds to 
be a normal stage of development prior to the onset of the paranoid-schizoid 
and depressive positions theorised by Melanie Klein.  Ogden draws  in his 
formulation on the writings of  Bick, Bion, Meltzer Tustin  and Winnicott, as 
well as on his own clinical work with adult sufferers from autism.5  
 
I have given examples of fields  child psychotherapy   where substantial new 
knowledge has been generated in the consulting room,  and made available 
to practitioners in their literature as it has emerged.   One could add many 
others. For example, the study of autism has led on to the investigation of the 
related disorder named  Asperger’s Syndrome. (Rhode and Klauber 2004).   
                                                                                                                             
understand her own body, and the feelings it gave rise to.  ‘What is this sensation?’ she 
seemed to be asking herself, the sensation in question often seeming to be located 
somewhere in her tummy. Clutching her   foot or her  hand, ‘what is  this, what does it do, 
what can I get it to do?’   ‘Why when I go over this way, do I come to a stop, or roll back 
again?  Much of the time, at this stage, baby granddaughter did not seem to have much 
space in her mind for outside objects, unless they could be put her in mouth, her mother 
excepted. 
 
But a few months later, how different.  Hands can grasp things which can be banged!  One 
can crawl at great speed. One can  climb up flights of stairs, bashing down on the  surface of 
the next step up, perhaps to see if it will bear weight.  One can pull objects apart, and try to 
put them together again.  Things and places are endlessly interesting, especially if there is 
someone around to share the interest.  And people!  ‘Here’s Mummy back again, how lovely!’ 
(‘Oh but I missed her, I now realise.) ‘Here’s grandma, I like grandma.'   'And here is the cat, 
eeeeek ! What excitement to see her again, and crawl along beside her,  watch her eating, 
pull  her fur!'     
 
What a difference, in other words, between the time when baby is mainly getting to know the 
boundaries and elementary capacities of herself and her own body and its sensations, with all 
the concentration this requires,  and what happens once something of this has been 
achieved, and when energies are  freed to look outwards, and start  experimenting upon the 
world.  It seems to me that the disorders and disruptions of autistic development may  take 
place at that first  stage, before exploration of the world  becomes possible, or that they may 
reawaken this primary  experience of disintegration and integration.    
 
 
5
 Note that the broader theoretical connections of these ideas have so far been elaborated 
more by psychoanalysts than by child psychotherapists.  It would incidentally strengthen the 
clinical research tradition of child psychotherapy if there were more frequent reviews in its 
literature of its various fields of work, updating and synthesising their findings.   
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Parallel to the study of autistic disorders in child psychotherapy has been the 
clinical investigation of more florid psychotic states, with the different technical 
and explanatory issues which they raise  (Rustin, Rhode, Dubinsky, Dubinsky 
1997.) 
 
 
The close attention to the anxieties attached to early infancy has  led to 
investigation of the experiences of infants born prematurely, or looked after in 
neo-natal units, throwing light on the traumatic nature of their under-protected 
situation, and  suggesting ways in which the quality of care could be brought 
closer to that of an infant cared for by its mother.  A further extension of this 
attentiveness to bodily and emotional anxiety,  in the context of the care of 
children in hospital, has led to sensitive observational studies which have 
shown what difference can be achieved if nurses  can learn to ‘be’  with 
children who have to suffer intrusive treatments, and enable them to feel that 
their feelings are understood, and that they need not be deprived of all choice 
and agency in their painful situation. (Hall  2003/4). 6  A related field of 
investigation is ‘parent-infant work’, in which difficulties in the early 
relationships between mothers and babies are attended to by creating a 
therapeutic space in which mothers are able to share some of their fears,  and 
learn that they can  understand what is happening to them and their baby.  
Once mothers’ extreme anxieties are relieved, and they become freer to 
observe and reflect,  babies also become less anxious. Mothers and babies 
may turn towards each other, and development can begin.  Infant observation 
is proving to be a major addition to psychoanalytic methods of investigation 
and intervention, with applications to  contexts beyond those of  infancy.  
 
Questions of  Method 
 
My contention is that the established tradition of clinical research in child 
psychotherapy, broadly following the methods of   discovery of  
                                            
6
 See also Pamela Sorensen's  (2000) paper on 'transition facilitating behaviour, arising from 
her work in a neo-natal unit, and related to this, Didier Houzel's (1995) concept of 
'precipitation anxiety'.   
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psychoanalysis, has been productive in generating new knowledge. It has  
enhanced our understanding of child development and its various difficulties 
and disorders, and has evolved new clinical  techniques in response to these.  
It has found new contexts of application for powerful psychoanalytical ideas – 
such as those of projective identification, counter transference and the total 
transference situation – and shown the relevance of classical ideas, such  as 
the Oedipal situation, to explaining hitherto unfamiliar disorders.    
 
But some argue that this  is insufficient.  Psychoanalysts and 
psychotherapists have to move closer to the scientific mainstream if their 
findings are to have wider credibility.  Nicholas Midgley  (2004, 2006) has 
proposed  that qualitative research methods developed in sociology and 
psychology may be useful in clinical research, and can lead to improvements 
in many of its procedures, in both the gathering and processing of data. He 
has rightly pointed out that child psychotherapists undertaking doctoral 
research projects are now  making use of systematic qualitative methods, 
such as 'grounded theory',  and the independent rating and interpretation of 
findings, to set their work on firmer ground.  Some substantial  projects, such 
as the Adolescent Depression Study undertaken by Judith Trowell, Maria 
Rhode, David Campbell and colleagues in Finland and Greece (Trowell et al 
2003), have gone  further in the formalisation of research methods. They have 
used standardised tests of mental health and well-being before, after, and in 
follow-ups of treatment; they have confined psychotherapy to a predetermined 
number of sessions; and they have audio-recorded therapy sessions to 
provide more reliable data.  In addition, this study has compared  courses of 
treatment of psychoanalytic child psychotherapy with systemic family therapy, 
thus establishing a comparative measure of outcome.  
 
Such developments are to be welcomed. Research  into the outcomes and 
effectiveness of treatment, is  particularly important  and urgent,  since in 
today's 'evidence-based' culture of health care  commissioners demand data 
to substantiate  claims for the value of psychotherapy, and are sometimes  
unwilling to accept professional advice  unsupported by statistical evidence.  
Outcome studies are one form of research in which systematic quantitative 
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techniques are essential, and where traditional clinical modes of discovery 
cannot suffice. 7 
 
But the implied idea that   psychoanalysts and psychotherapists have been 
methodologically naive, compared with the  researchers from psychology, 
sociology and other  human science disciplines, is not  well-based.  One of 
Nicholas Midgley's (2004, 2006) two valuable  contributions to this debate,  
'Between Scylla and Charybis: Incorporating qualitative approaches into child 
psychotherapy research', cited  a three-phase chronology of psychoanalytic 
research proposed by  John McLeod (2001).  In the first of these, up to the 
1950s, 'the main emphasis was on description and discovery, and the primary 
means of research was the single case-study.'  In the second phase, from the 
1950s onwards, 'consolidation and routinisation' gradually became dominant. 
The aim supposedly shifted from 'discovery to verification, with the aim of 
establishing a firm professional basis to our work.' In the third and current 
phase, which Midgley sees as  a time of 'uncertainty and opportunity', there 
are  pressures to develop an 'evidence-base' using  'scientific' empirical 
measures,  but there are also new  opportunities to bring sophisticated 
qualitative methods to bear on psychoanalytic questions.  
 
 
Although it is true that the turn to qualitative methods in the social sciences is  
beneficial for psychoanalysis, McLeod's  historical underpinning of this 
argument is quite misleading. The reality  is that psychoanalysts have 
continued to  make major discoveries, using clinical case-study methods, 
throughout the decades from the 1950s to the present. These years  saw the 
publications of  analysts such as  Segal, Bion, Rosenfeld, Joseph, 
O'Shaughnessy, Britton, Sandler, Steiner, Ogden and Bollas, as well as  
those  of the child psychotherapists referred to above. The lexicon of ideas 
and theories which is employed by most child psychotherapists today would 
not exist without this  record of clinical research.  For example, one of the 
                                            
7
 Sometimes however this professional pressure leads to research into outcomes being seen 
as  virtually synonomous with research itself.  See for example Hodges  (1999) in Lanyado 
and Horne (1999).   
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crucial  ideas  now being operationalised in a quantitative empirical form by 
Peter Fonagy, Anthony Bateman and others, that of mentalisation, seems to 
have as one of its main origins  Bion's  theory of the mind. 
 
What also  goes unnoticed in the undervaluation of the clinical psychoanalytic 
tradition are the substantive reflections made  by  analysts and child 
psychotherapists on their own  methods of research (though they do not 
usually describe it in these terms.)  Bion's investigation of psychotic states of 
mind required him to recognise as 'data' phenomena that had been hitherto 
unintelligible to psychoanalysts. His own discussion of the 'selected fact' and 
the mode of  seeing coherence in these phenomena drew on the 
mathematical ideas of Poincaré, and anticipated the subsequent development 
of complexity theory.(Rustin 2002b). In a similar way, Betty Joseph's 
understanding of the 'total transference situation' (Joseph 1989, 1998)          
required her to reconsider the meaning of the facts of the psychoanalytic 
encounter,  enhancing the level of detail in which clinical phenomena were 
perceived, as if a new instrument  had appeared which could find meaning in  
sequence, timing, interaction and silences in clinical interactions.   The   
fundamental idea of projective identification (Sandler 1988) required 
psychotherapists to think of patients' communications as actions or 
enactments, rather than merely as representations of hidden levels of 
meaning.  Developments in the philosophy of language which had led to the 
acknowledgement of the 'performative' aspects of 'speech acts'  thus had their 
equivalent in psychoanalytic practice, probably not  under the direct influence 
of the philosophers, but as a   parallel discovery. Meltzer's (1978) commitment 
to a 'hermeneutic' and  vehemently 'non-causal view of psychoanalytic theory, 
in his account of the Freud-Klein-Bion tradition, also echoed the  
'interpretative turn’  which was taking place in those years in philosophy and 
the social sciences.  Counter-transference is a methodological as well as a 
clinical resource, since it identifies a new source of information.   It is surely 
also clear that the discoveries of child psychotherapists described above have  
depended on new ways of  perceiving and understanding clinical phenomena,  
whether through the counter-transference or through fine-grained  observation 
of  links between body and mind.  
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Criticism of psychoanalysis for blurring the boundaries between facts and 
theoretical inferences drawn from them was anticipated in psychoanalytic and 
child psychotherapy practice  before it became an issue for research 
methodologists. The tradition of  psychoanalytic infant observation was 
founded in the 1940s on the discipline of detailed, literal, descriptive report,  
precisely to instil an empirical habit of mind among trainee psychotherapists.  
Closely Observed Infants, the first book to systematically set out  this method, 
in 1987 made a  commitment to the distinction between data and theory 
absolutely plain, as did  Meltzer (1967 chapter 4).  What proved decisive in 
'The  Controversial Discussions' in the early 1940s, in gaining support for 
some of Melanie Klein's  ideas, was the evidence provided by her new 
method of child analysis. It was primarily a new kind of clinical fact that 
convinced the uncommitted members of the professional community.   (King 
and Steiner 1991).  
 
The fact is that  discovery in psychoanalysis has always  depended on  a self-
critical attitude to clinical data.   Psychoanalytic theories assign meaning and 
connectedness to specified kinds of facts; without attention to the nature of 
these facts and how they are apprehended, there could be no valid or useful 
theories.   The 75th Anniversary Special Issue (1994) of the International 
Journal of Psychoanalysis on clinical facts was an  important milestone in 
psychoanalytic engagement with these issues. (Tuckett 1994a and b). 
Psychoanalysts   who began their work in other  disciplines, such as the 
former sociologists  Elizabeth Spillius, David Tuckett, and  Susan Budd, have 
brought to these questions familiarity with wider debates on methods.   
Psychologists such as  Peter Fonagy have brought another disciplinary cross-
fertilisation. (Fonagy 2001).   Glaser and Strauss's grounded theory, which 
came from sociology but which has been found so useful by  psychoanalytic 
researchers, consists of a method of moving inductively between qualitative 
data and concepts which is  very close to the  way in which in clinical practice 
and supervision  meaning is  expected to  emerge from study of the material, 
while holding theoretical preconceptions at a distance.  
 
 21 
 
This is not to question  the relevance to child psychotherapy of the  range of  
qualitative  methods which been developing in recent years, in what has been 
in fact a veritable 'methodological boom'  in the social sciences.8  Child 
psychotherapists often feel  anxious about their own lack of expertise about 
research methods, and they find that psychoanalytic   ideas are attacked as 
‘unscientific’.  While they need to respect their own tradition, and understand 
its contributions to knowledge, they  can and should   use more systematic 
and transparent research methods. They will find that they provide valuable 
resources for  their own  investigations.   
 
But there are two major complications which  need to be kept in mind as child 
psychotherapists draw upon research methods whose original application has 
usually   been outside the field of psychoanalysis.   The first of these is that an 
‘object’ of investigation is  often  related to its method of inquiry  in quite 
definite and determinate ways.  Ontologies -  conceptions of what is – are 
usually associated in a logical way to epistemologies -  conceptions of how 
one knows something.  Research methods are not  all-purpose tools, fit to be 
bolted-on to any field of study. One would expect that psychoanalysis with its   
particular object of knowledge, namely unconscious mental process, would 
come to have particular  methods of research, designed specifically for  the 
understanding of this object and its qualities.  This is indeed  the case.  
 
A related point  is that forms of relevant knowledge are specific to their 
audiences or users, as well as to their objects.  Mental health commissioners 
quite reasonably need to know about the effectiveness of treatments which 
can be  delivered in relatively standard and predictable ways. How else can 
they make rational judgements about how best  to use their resources?  
                                            
8
 Although interest in research methodology has followed naturally on the expansion of 
research itself, the  current insistence on prescribed methodological training for all 
researchers in the social sciences, sanctioned by the funding system, is not an unqualified 
good. It also reflects a culture of credentialisation and regulation in academic and professional 
life, designed to exclude  as well as to enable. This is seen also in the meticulous rules 
concerning 'ethical permission' for research, even in some places for undergraduate 
dissertations where formerly the judgement ot tutors was thought an adequate  safeguard of 
practice. 
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Particular kinds of knowledge need to be gathered to inform such decision-
making. But therapeutic clinicians, expecting to work with an individual 
patient, though they should know about significant research on different 
categories of patient (looked-after children for example) and on treatment 
outcomes, need a more specialised kind of knowledge as well. This takes  the 
form of a virtual library of  relevant  conceptions,  theories, and   cases,  so 
that when the ‘unknown’ of the patient or the therapeutic session appears, 
they have to hand the discriminations  with which to think about them. Such 
primary knowledge  makes possible the  treatment outcomes which justify a 
mental health service,  but it has a  level of delicacy and specificity which 
managers and policy-makers can best  leave to the practitioners.  
 
The fact is that most of the understanding produced hitherto in the practice of 
psychoanalysis has so far been of a kind relevant to clinicians, and its 
intended  users have mainly been psychoanalysts and psychotherapists.   
The ‘speciation’ of concepts, theories, classifications and techniques in 
complexity of thinking  which matches that of the patients,  and which  has 
evolved  with  their presenting problems  as a consequence of many kinds of 
change.  
 
It follows that while  exploration of the range of research methodologies now 
so evidently on the market in the human sciences should be pursued 
vigorously by child psychotherapists,  the best research outcomes are unlikely 
to be achieved by treating research methods merely as bolt-on toolkits,  
needed as remedies for endemic psychoanalytic backwardness.  What is 
required, as always in good  research, is the interrogation of available  
methods to see how far they can provide answers to  new research questions.   
The subtleties of the psychoanalytic and child psychotherapeutic tradition of 
inquiry, described above, and its rich resources of theory, need to be brought 
into dialogue with  research techniques developed in other contexts.  
Innovation, when it occurs, usually has a methodological as well as a 
substantive dimension.  Such hybridisation has already been taking place in 
psychotherapist researchers'  use of ‘grounded theory’,  who, contrary to 
Glaser and Strauss's original  prescription of a theory-free inductive approach,  
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have  usually chosen to work within a psychoanalytic frame of reference from 
the start, while remaining  open to new conjectures informed by it.  9   
 
There are  interesting questions to be addressed in these exchanges.  For 
example, can the procedures adopted to carry out ‘outcome studies’ not only 
measure treatment effectiveness, but also throw light on the underlying 
psychological conditions of patients, and on optimal techniques of treatment? 
Or will traditional psychoanalytic  methods, albeit somewhat up-scaled 
through multiple and comparative case-studies   and made more accountable 
in their  analysis of  data, retain their comparative advantage as the best ways 
of learning about unconscious mental life and the therapeutic process? 10 
 
There is much to be learned from the  participation of psychoanalysts and 
child psychotherapists in this growing debate about methods of research.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
9
 On the uses of grounded theory in psychoanalysis, see Anderson (2006).  
10
 Such studies may demonstrate not only that psychoanalytic psychotherapy 'works', but also 
that it works because of the use  for example of the transference, the counter-transference, or 
the negative transference. Such demonstrations of the validity of core psychoanalytic ideas 
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